Whatever be the case, Bose was soon able to establish himself as the most important foreign leader on Japanese soil and he soon developed the INA on an independent footing and thereafter set up a Provisional Government of Free India. He had the national flag, the national anthem, separate insignia for the officers and men of the liberation army, protocol to be mutually followed in greeting by the Indian and Japanese officials, full authority over the army and the Government, a national bank, independent avenues for collecting funds for maintaining the army and the government, and even a separate currency (albeit in limited quantity) to be used on Indian soil when it would come under the Azad Hind Government— all achieved in less than a year. Bose was ever touchy about the independence of his Government and even declined to accept the highest honour of the Japanese emperor saying that would be happy to accept when the day of Indian independence arrived. This was in striking contrast to the Burmese Independent Army (BIA) chief Aung San proudly wearing the rank and insignia of a Japanese colonel and displaying the Japanese medallions. (17) Every eyewitness account says that the Indians were always courteously treated by the Japanese authorities and were set apart from other Asians. A Japanese handbook meant for Japanese soldiers dealing with the INA which was picked up by the British intelligence during the war, instructed Japanese soldiers to treat their INA, counterparts with respect and acknowledge them to be "not by any means a fifth column of the Japanese Army", nor a convenient source of coolie labour, but as men "fighting for the Independence of their motherland, fighting our common enemy with a common purpose"— in one word, true allies. (18) This is not to say that the Japanese authorities en-masse supported Bose and his ideas. As it has been already stated, a sizeable section of the Japanese military bureaucracy had no sympathy for his cause and disapproved of his closeness to Tojo. Time and again he had to face obstacles from them even in petty matters. When a decision was taken in Tojo's cabinet to hand over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the Azad Hind Government, it was frustrated by the Japanese generals ostensibly for military reasons so much so that when Col. A. D. Lokanathan was sent as the chief commissioner of the island on behalf on the Azad Hind Government in early 1944, he was not allowed to function freely and had to leave the place on health grounds in September, 1944. A few weeks earlier when Bose had visited Port Blair for a couple of days in late December, 1943 the Japanese officials had organized impressive functions in his honour, but had arranged his itinerary in such a manner that he had virtually no time to meet the local people hear their grievances properly. (19)

Nevertheless, inspite of all odds the INA soon became as excellent fighting force under Bose's leadership. The Japanese generals were initially doubtful about its fighting capacity, but after the Arakans campaign in which the INA showed exemplary courage, such doubts subsided. Slim has characterically understated the feat of the INA soldiers in his own account of the war, but he has mentioned that a formation of the Indian National Army was "close to the front" with "an intention to penetrate into India where the renegades would be used in the attempt to rouse rebellion." (20) The fact was that an INA Bahadur group of two hundred men attached to the Japanese 55th Division commancfed by Major Laksman Sarup Mishra stole the show there and helped the Japanese trap the 7th Division of the enemy at Buthidang on the eastern side of the Mayo Range on February 5, 1944. This group also won to the Indian side a sizeable number of men from a British-Indian outpost including a Gwalior Regiment which came over to the INA on February 12, 1944. Bose himself visited the front and issued a special order of the day giving the slogan "Onward to Delhi." (21) Later an INA battalion under. Major R S. Rathore inflicted a major defeat on a segment of the West African Division of the British army on the Kaladan river and advanced upto to Mowdak well within India by defeating the British in the battles of Paletwa and Daletmi. Rathore's men captured Mowdak with reckless coverage and hoisted the Indian tricolour on the soil of Mowdak which formed part of the liberated Indian territory under the Azad Hind Government. In the battle of Kohima too, the INA soldiers overran a number of British posts and basted the enemy in many skirmishes.

Bose had always wanted that the INA should be allotted one particular sector of the front where he would lead the men personally on the battlefield. His own choice remained the Arakan region from where he could make forays into Chittagong and the rest of Bengal. It was his firm belief that if he could move with 30,000 soldiers into south-eastern Bengal, the local youth would break into a partisan warfare and destroy railway lines and airfields forcing the British to evacuate their army to safe areas and thus release their hold on Imphal. There was an element of gamble in the plan, but, as later events proved, there was every possibility of success. The Japanese military leaders rejected this plan on the ground that in the Arakana region the INA would be subjected to heavy aerial and naval bombardment. Major P. S. Rathore's battalion of one thousand INA soldiers mentioned by Slim in his account (22) which marched deep into Indian territory and one segment of which under Captain Surajmal kept their hold on Mowdak till September 1944 did not face any such hazard. Obstructed by the Japanese military bureaucracy in his plan, Bose optimistically waited for the INA to participate in a freedom offensive on the Kohima-Imphal front.

III

When in January, 1944, Tojo and his generals finally decided to assault north-eastern India jointly with the INA in accordance with the agreement with Bose (23) and to gain at least one spectacular battle victory to boost their sagging morale, the British were least prepared for it. This was primarily because there was lack of intelligence about the enemy's plans and movements. Whatever information was trickling down from the forward intelligence set-up and from interrogation of the arrested INA soldiers called by them as "JIFS" or "JIFFS" (Japanese inspired firth-columnist spies) or their supporters inside India was simply not enough. (24) This will be clear from the graphic eyewitness account of Charles R. Pawsey, the then deputy commissioner of the Naga Hill District, contrary to the tall claims made by Slim and others. Pawsey was an extraordinarily resourceful person and was popular among the Naga tribes who lived around Kohima, Okha and Mokokchung in Nagaland. He played a very significant role in turning a defeat into victory and was knighted for his achievement after the war. He wrote thus in his official file : "This siege of Kohima will go down in history as the siege that failed but only just. The Japanese boasted on April 9th that they had captured Kohima— a boast that was absolutely justified in view of the fact that by that time they held Kohima Bazar, Kohima Town, Kohima villages and every building of importance including the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow. Only the hill above the DCs bungalow was then held, and the Japanese had completely surrounded and cut off the small garrison that was left to defend it. If the garrison had fallen the Japanese would have very likely over-run Dimapur, where there was no force strong enough to oppose them, nor natural feature strong enough to defend/Ever experts at fighting in the jungle the Japanese would have found it easy to penetrate to the railway, and advance along the line until eventually all Assam would have been in their hands. No trained fighting troops were there to oppose them, nor would their advance have been stemmed until they were held up by the Brahmaputra. After this it would be unprofitable to attempt to predict what might have taken place. Let us turn, rather and examine the events that actually occurred, and see how the Japanese invasion was defeated from gaining its object.

"During the whole of March, there had been many rumours that the Japanese were coming, and that Kohima would be attacked by the right wing of large Japanese force stretching from Tiddim to Homalin, with Imphal as its central and immediate objective. These rumours were credited by few, for, ever since May 1942, rumours of a similar nature had been common. It came as a rude shock therefore, when, on March 20th, all troops in Kohima were ordered to get immediately into defensive positions— known at that time as 'boxes'. At the same time hospitals, and similar units, who possessed numbers of noncombatant personnel, were evacuated as quickly as possible to Dimapur and beyond, whilst smaller and isolated units moved into Kohima to combine with each other to defend naturally strong features and positions.

"Needless to say, complete confusion reigned. Though the army had prepared numerous 'Defence Schemes' on numerous sheets of paper, very few practice had been held, and it would not be an exaggeration to say that the large majority had very little idea what to do. Not that this mattered, for new orders were issued in torrents (each one countermanding, amending, confirming and altering the last), and units were moved in all directions with such rapidity, that even the placid social life of Kohima came to realize that something was about to happen. It was not until April 3rd (two weeks after first alarm), that those in command had decided definitely what plan to adopt. By that time it was too late to dig properly into position or fix barbed wire so that when the Japanese attacked on April 4th they found positions (which could have easily been made impregnable) improperly prepared, and the Sub-Area Commander strategically withdrawn to Dimapur." (25)

The confusion in Kohima town on the eve of the attack by the allied armies of Japan and the Azad Hind Government has been etched in the following manner in the eye-witness account of the army intelligence officer Arthur Campbell: "As we moved forward, more and more trucks came hurrying from Kohima, packed with frightened men, many of them deserters. There were others straggling along the road on foot, half trotting, half running, to escape from what lay behind diem. They must have been on the road for two or three days. John soon saw the danger of passing of these frightened men, even though none of them stopped to talk with us who were driving in to take their place. Panic needs no words to its evil influence; it passes silently through the air like a giant shadow while the people run this way or that to escape its menace; and while they run, fear grips them until they are half insane.... Now and then an officer came driving fast in a jeep or on a motor cycle and these we stopped because we wanted to know what lay ahead of us. All told a story of disorganisation and lack of spirit within the perimeter of Kohima town." (26)

Meanwhile, the three battalions of the Subhas Brigade of the INA under Shah Nawaz Khan— 3200 handpicked soldiers determined to fight to the last for the independence of their country— were marching alongside the Japanese army from victory to victory in the Imphal-Kohima sector. Another division of 2800 INA troops of the Gandhi Brigade under I. J. Kiani were fighting valiantly in the Imphal sector while the Azad Brigade consisting of 2800 men were put into action in the Myintha sector. Another 1000 men belonging to the Bahadur group of the INA and attached in small segments with the Japanese regiments had already engaged in espionage and subversive activities behind the enemy lines. The situation then prevailing on the Kohima front comes alive in the words of Charles Pawsey: "In the light of the present knowledge, it is now clear that the Japanese must have been advancing in numbers from the Chindwin towards the Dimapur-lmphal road. At that time, however, little was known of their movements. The first definite news that Kohima heard was that the road had been cut off at Kangpokpi, and that it was no longer possible to reach Imphal. This was on the 28th of March. About the same time it was reported that the Japanese were attacking the Assam Regiment out at Jessami. How this regiment held out for so long and then fought their way out and back to Kohima to arrive in time to help to defend it is a story in itself. The next news that reached Kohima was on April the first, to say that the Japanese had advanced both along the jeep track from Gaziphema and the Kohima road from Kangpokpi to reach Mao. Their strength was reported to be not more than two hundred — a report that was unfortunately believed. From then on reports came in frequently, and the advance could be followed as they reached Viswema, Jakhama, Kigwema and Phesama. Finally on the afternoon of April the fourth, Kohima was attacked." (27)

In fact, the battle for Kohima began on March 28 and the Dimapur-lmphal road was fully captured by March 31. The INA soldiers took active part in all these offensives. On April 8 the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters made the following announcement concerning the military development in Burma: (a) the Japanese crack troops fighting side by side with the Indian National Army, captured Kohima early on 6 April; and (b) their attack on the enemy's airborne troops in the Kata area was moving along smoothly. (28) The INA personnel exhorted Indian soldiers in the British posts through loud-hailers to desert the foreigners and join their army. (29) There was some exodus of Indian soldiers from the British army to the INA around this time including Gorkhas about whose loyalty the British were very possessive (Gel. Slim and Brig. Wingate were particularly so). The exodus started well before the Kohima offensive due to the activities of the INA operatives who had infiltrated into north­eastern India in a significant number. According to an army intelligence lookout notice sent on November 23, 1943, nineteen " JIFS" were organised in three parties by Japanese Lt. Yamade and Udhe Singh at Mawlaik for going ahead in the Chin Hills to buy information and for propaganda, six of whom— Ram Chandra Thapa (1/3rd Gorkha Regiment), Mohan (?) Ram (18 Auxiliary pnr. Bn.), Ha v. Ram Rekha (who died in custody), Sepoy Inder Singh (1/15 Dogra Regiment), Nk. Bal Bahadur Gurung (3/2 Gorkha Regiment— Brig. Wingate's) and Hav. Ranjit Singh (12 Supply Coy. R. I. A. S. C. ) — were later captured. (30) On February 16, 1944, Pawsey sent an account of some "Gorkha Jiffs" and Assam Regiment personnel working for the INA to the Simla office which was later forwarded to Slim for taking necessary action. In the battle for capturing Kohima the INA fought in three groups under Capt. Ajmer Singh Lt. Mohammed Hussain and Lt. Gurcharan Singh respectively, while the re-enforcement was kept in charge of Lt. Dal Bahadur— a Gorkha officer. (31)

By early 1943 the INA had developed a good intelligence network in Assam, Manipur and Nagland with the help of local tribals and other inhabitants. Bose himself kept in touch of the ethnic leaders of north-eastern India. Radha Binode Koijam (who became the chief minister of Manipur in the post-independence era) was in his personnel staff. A. Z. Phizo, the Naga rebel leader, also avowedly met him in Burma sometime before the INA offensive. In March 1943 the C. I. D. Delhi came to know from interrogation a student activist of Ramjas College, Delhi, about the daring plan of Kashi Nath Bhattacharya of the Bengal Volunteers (which owed allegiance to Bose) to blow up railway lines in Assam with the help of the tribals and a deserter of the Bengal Saffers and Miners. (32)

In the official account of Pawsey the following information has been recorded : "In December (1943) the first party of the Jiffs came through the Naga hills. There were fourof them. One was Rifleman Luolie Angami who gave the other three the slip and reported to the Shere Regiment at Phek. Unfortunately the information was delayed and the other three whom the Nagas took to be the survey party got as far as Ghaspani where they were caught. The other three were really bad, but there was nothing wrong with Luolie. He had done exactly as a good and loyal soldier." (33) There were also reports with the administration that the Kukis from the INA-occupied territory used to go unchecked to the Manipur road and then report about the British dispositions to the INA and the Japanese. The INA personnel were known as "Congress-wallahs" to the local tribes. (34) The fact that the tribals were being increasingly lured by the INA and the Japanese was brought home latter in the Foreigners Survey No. 49 of 1943 which was circulated to the deputy commissioner, Naga Hills, the political agent Imphal, and the superintendent, Lushai Hills, Aizawl, the central intelligence officer, Assam. (35)

A new phase in the INA's campaign against the British army in north-eastern India commenced at the full-moon in April, 1943, when the "agent parties equipped with wireless were landed by parachutes in Assam." The members of four of these parties consisting of three persons in each, had already been arrested but it was believed that another three parties — one party consisting of four — were quite likely also landed. Such party had an operator with equipment and usually two scouts to collect intelligence about aerodromes, troop concentrations, communications especially bridge, recruitment and public morale. (36) Reports also indicated possibility of an attempt to drop infiltration parties by parachutes throughout the monsoon (mid-June to September) in a large area from Ranchi to Benaras and in the coastal area from Vishakhapatnam to Cape Camorin. (37) Earlier there had been reports that the INA operatives had received parachute training in Burma towards the end of February, 1943. The Kanbe Institute, Rangoon and the Indian Swaraj Institute, Penang, played a significant role in trainingthe INA personnel.

Predictably, the British intelligence in India worked overtime during this feverish period and churned out a lot of information from their own sources about the INA paratroopers whom they called "BATS" (possibly meaning "Burma area trainees") and the overland operatives. These men had hideouts in far-flung places including the Kali temple in Calcutta and had nexus with Congressmen and revolutioneries. The intelligence alerts and the lookout notices contained details about the routes used by them, their contacts and hideouts for taking executive action. One such lookout notice contained a list of twenty-one important activities, which included the name of Major (Dr.) K. Narasismha Rao, son-in-law of Sir S. Radhakrishnan, who was then the vice-chancellor of the Benaras Hindu University.(38) Heavy rewards were announced by the government for apprehending these infiltrators, particularly "Bats", by the word of mouth only, with a cetegorical instruction that no written notice was to be criculated in the matter. (39) But the panic in the government was clearly visible.

The concern of the British administration for the activities of the INA lends credence to the belief that Bose's plan to incite a rebellion and a partisan warfare with his 30,000 men inside India could after all have succeeded. One major reason for the failure of the offensive was the rigidity of the Japanese commanders in not making suitable changes in their strategy. Instead of taking Dimapur hands down, the Japanese army hopelessly got delayed in trying to capture Kohima as planned. Moreover, it was a blunder on the part of Field Marshal Terauchi and his commanders not to have accepted Bose's plan to take the battle to the Assam plains. Had they agreed to allow Bose to have his way and give necessary military support to him to lead his 30,000 men to fight on Indian soil, the result of the offensive might have been different. In that case, inspite of Japan's eventual defeat in the war, the British in India would have been on the run. The Japanese generals understandably chose their own interests over Bose's.

One factor that stood uppermost in turning the tide was the residence and courage of a few hundred British soldiers and some civilian officers like Pawsey trapped in the Kohima hills that made history for their nation. Another factor that has not been dwelt upon adequately is the support Pawsey and his men got from the local Naga tribes. The British propaganda against the INA and the Japanese was so effective among these Nagas that they helped the British administration and the army with information about the location and movement of the outside forces, denied them food and shelter whenever possible and harassed them incessantly with surprise attacks. They also worked as scouts and coolies for the British and American soldiers. The Naga Labour Corps was particularly useful to them during the offensive. A portion of the Labour Corps was given training in handling arms to tackle "Jiffs and stragglers". Some of them later cooperated with the INA, for which some Kuki and Gorkha riflemen of the 3rd Assam Rifles were labelled "grey" and detained even after the war. Many local Nagas like Zopianga who had helped the British were rewarded after the War for their loyalty and they did well for themselves after independence. Another such person Thepfisu-u Angami who was the "dobhasi" (interpreter, a powerful institution in the Naga society created by the British and is still prevalent) in the deputy commissioner's office, gave the following account in his dialect for being considered for a reward : "On 3rd May, 1944,1 went to Zulhama. There I met Sathuzura, a Japanese officer. They had collected pigs, chickens and rice from Zulhama for their ration and left for Sathusuma village. I reported the matter to our Government Inspection Bungalow. We were waiting for the Japanese soldiers to come later. We saw four Japanese soldiers coming. When they came closer we shot them. One died on the spot, the other two ran away to the jungle and died later. One of the two Japanese soldiers who ran to the jungle shot dead one Sema scout. So the other Sema scout pulled out the body of the Japanese soldier earlier killed on the spot and they chopped his body into many pieces."

The story of Khruthei Angami, a police constable ran thus: "During our stay at Chazuba, we learnt that our British soldiers were coming to Khesora village. So from Khesora village two British troops and some Gorkha soldiers were brought to Chazuba. At that time many Japanese and enemy soldiers were staying at Chazaba. When we gathered enough soldiers, we attacked the Japanese soldiers. In the attack five villagers were killed and two badly injured. Some villagers were arrested... when we were ready to leave for Phek, there was no coolie to carry our load. So we went to the field and got hold of two groups of local people who were working in the field. Our met have offered me a drink, but his wife came and threw away my cup. I then explained to them that they should come and help the government. Finally they agreed and came along with me to carry our load. After reaching Phek we received air-dropped rations."

Even after the war the British civil and army officials continued their efforts to demean the INA in the eyes of the local people in a bid to wean them away from its influence. They had in their various administrative measures already created a divide among the people of the plains and the hills, the plainsmen requiring a special permit to come to the hills. Now they sought to put the blame of the ravages caused by the bombings and other army actions on the INA soldiers — the "Congress-wallahs" — to denigrate them further. This was despite the fact that Pawsey himself admitted in an official noting that the British and American troops had caused more damage to the Naga villages with their thoughtless bombings and firings than the enemy could ever hope to-do. Charless Ogilvie, who was appointed as the director of the Assam relief measures after the War, reported on the matter also thus : "Houses containing paddy were set alight by the military as a measure of denial and the fire inevitably spread to other houses so that, even before fighting began, a good many houses and the greater portion of the paddy stocks had been completely destroyed." (40) At one point Pawsey and Ogilvie mentioned that the Japanese and the INA (variously called as "renegade Indians", "Indian traitors" "who did not trouble to hide their political faith" etc. in Ogilvie's report) paid for their food while staying in the outskirts of their villages and generally kept to themselves and treated the villagers well. (41)

Even after India's independence propaganda against Bose and the INA did not cease. This is because the Congress leaders who ruled the country then—Nehru, Patel and Pant—were all politically opposed to him. Display of Bose's photograph or image was prohibited in the parliament and the government offices and efforts were made to project the INA as really of no consequence in the country's freedom struggle. A pliant bureaucracy and a significant section of the Anglophile media and academia, which did not like Bose and his revolutionary ideas, helped in these efforts. The INA men were denied job in the army or other security agencies by a secret directive of the Nehru government on the basis of an erroneous logic that since they had once broken the oath of allegiance to their British master, they could again do so. The revolutionary content of their actions and the magnitude of their sacrifices for their country were quietly allowed to be forgotten by the new masters.

Notes:

17. Aung San was later wooed by the British intelligence and turned his back on the Japanese when they were being routed by the British. After the War the British praised him as a patriot for his wartime help to them.

18. Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army, p. 260-61.

19. B. R. Tamta, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, National Book Trust, pp. 57-58.

20. Field Marshal W. J. Slim, Defeat unto Victory. Cassell, London, p. 201.

21. K. S. Giani. Indian Independence Movement in East Asia (Singh Brothers, Lahore. January 15. 1947). pp. 115-16. Major L. S. Mishra was awarded the Sardar-e-Jang Medal and Lt. Peari Singh was given Vir-e-Hind Medal by Netaji on July 4, 1944, for their bravery in the battle. Mishra whose father was Pandit Ghanshyam Das belonged to Misrana Mohalla in Mainpuri, U. P. and his bio-particulars and photograph were sent by the C. I. O. Shillong to D. C. Naga Hills, Kohima, vide his no. 968/C dated May 26. 1943, for his immediate arrest if found in Manipur.

22. Field Marshal Slim, Defeat Unto Victory, p. 205.

23. Joyce Lebra, Bose's Influence on the formation of Japanese Policy towards India and the INA. op. cit., Netaji and India's Freedom (Netaji Research Bureau, 1973). p. 324

24. Arthur Campbell. MC. The Siege, A Story from Kohima (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 1956). pp. 37-38.          ,

25. Note of C. R. Pawsey on the War account dated March 22. 1946.

26. Arthur Campbell, The Siege, A Story from Kohima, pp. 50-51.

27. Note of C. R. Pawsey dated March 22. 1946.

28. Tatsuo Hayashida. Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, His Great Struggle and Martyrdom (Allied Publishers, 1970), p. 88.

29. Arthur Campbell, The Siege, A Story from Kohima. pp. 92 and 95

30. The notice no. SC/1NT/2/355 dated November 28, 1943, was circulated along with a few other documents vide memo no. 22194-207 SB/C/-i(6) (N) -43/Part II dated December 15. 1943. by the office of the DIG of police. Assam.

31. Lt. M. G. Mulkar's diary. Netaji Centenary Memorial Collection. Loknath Prakashani. vol. 6. in the Bengali translation p. 75.

32. D. O. No. D-73/p.1 dated May 31. 1943 of the Superintendent of Police CID. Delhi to DIG. CID and IB, Calcutta.

33. Note of C. R. Pawsey. p. 23.

34. Ibid.

35. C. I. O. Assam Memo No. 11/For/155/57C dated January 19, 1944.

36. Memo. No. 7136-49 of C. I. D. Shillong dated July 3. 1943.

37. Foreigners survey No. 19 of 1943 for the week ending on May 15, 1943.

38. Memo. No. 40/J.C./43 (8) of the Intelligence Bureau. Home Department, Government of India, dated November 27. 1943.

39. Most Secret Circular No. 2154-69-C/II-W/23-43 from R. C. R. Cumming, IGP Assam, dated may 31. 1943. and addressed to all SPs. SRP, Assam, and all political officers in north-eastern India.

40. A Report on the Measures of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction undertaken by the Government of India in the Naga Hills and Manipur State in order to repair the Ravages caused by the Japanese invasion of 1944, p. 2.

41. Ibid,p.4.

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